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Executive Summary 
This study investigated the economics of an Edwards Aquifer region “dry-year option”
buyout directed toward decreasing agricultural water use in an effort to augment spring flow. 
The research was separated into eleven tasks: (1) alternative irrigation strategies were
developed and yields estimated for a number of deficit irrigation possibilities; (2) cost and return
budgets were developed for the irrigation strategies; (3) an Edwards Aquifer regional level
agricultural model was constructed; (4) three dry-year option definitions were developed - one
involved a November announcement and interruption, the others involved June 1 interruptions:
one without prior announcement and the other announced as a possibility in November with the
interruption occurring in June 1 under low recharge; (5) a set of regression equations were
developed predicting springflow consequences of interruption; (6) the springflow equations and
the regional agricultural model was used to develop data on the consequences of alternative dry-
year option prices; (7) a third party impact, input-output model was developed to look at the off-
farm implications of the dry-year option; (8) potential compensation mechanisms to mitigate off-
farm income losses were investigated; (9) the question of whether compensation was in order was
examined as well as the identities of affected parties; (10) the model was delivered to the sponsors
in disk form as was a workshop for sponsor employees; and (11)  estimates were developed of the
municipal and industrial demand for water exchanges over a range of prices.
The main findings during this research were:
1) There are alternatives that farmers selling water can use such as dryland farming or
deficit irrigation if a June 1 cutoff is a possibility.
2) The springflow regressions revealed a dramatic difference in the implications of 
curtailed pumping in the eastern versus the western counties.  Several times more
springflow is generated in the current year when the pumping is curtailed east as
opposed to west of the Knippa gap. This led us to examine separate dry-year
options for eastern and western counties. 
3) The November announcement of a dry-year option generated some water even at
very low prices ($10 per acre).  At an offer price of  $90 per acre, most of the
water in the region was sold. In the western region, considerably higher starting
prices were required, but water use was again essentially curtailed at $90 per acre. 
However, when using western water the cost per unit springflow was much higher.
4) The cost of the water saved by the dry-year option is substantially greater when
the option is exercised during the cropping season(June).  Higher prices must be
paid to get about half as much water as could be gotten under the November
exercise.  Also, an early announcement of the possibility of a mid-season option
under low recharge allows land to enter the program more cheaply, but lowers the
amount of water use reduction as farmers use crop mix and irrigation strategies
which are not as dependent on late season water.
5) A dry-year option program based on local taxes exhibits greater regional income
losses than one wherein compensation is funded externally.  As many as 500 jobs
are involved with a $5 to 36 million dollar range on loss of regional gross income.
The secondary economic impacts fall most heavily on Uvalde and Medina counties.
6) History indicates that compensation to third parties affected by a specific economic
change is rare. Classical economic theory indicates that regional losses are offset
by secondary benefits elsewhere and does not recommend compensation.
However, compensation to injured third parties may be a useful strategy for easing
dry-year option policy implementation.
7) Compensation should not be paid to local government as revenues are not likely to
be lost. Compensation may be in order to private businesses and individuals; farm
labor; crop tenants; farm supply and service businesses; and speciality production
and marketing systems.
8) Several assumptions were required to design and examine the dry-year option,
some of which may not be absolutely in accord with the way the dry-year option is
ever implemented. Thus, we developed a transportable regional economic model in
which assumptions may be modified. However, we cannot deliver the input-output
model.
9) We found the usage of municipal and industrial water fell from 336 thousand acre
feet when water was not priced (a zero price was used) to 133 thousand acre feet
when a $500/acre foot charge was used.  Higher water usage occurred under the
drier years and lower water usage in the wetter years.  
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1Brief description of study: 
This study investigated the economics of an Edwards Aquifer region “dry-year option” buyout
directed toward decreasing agricultural water use in an effort to augment springflow.  The research
involved several phases.  First, we applied crop growth simulation models to quantify the expected yield
of major crops by weather year for alternative irrigation strategies.  Second, crop enterprise budgets
were developed for these strategies for entry into a farm level simulation model.  Third, equations were
developed which predicted the monthly springflow implications of changes in agricultural water use. 
Fourth, a “dry-year” agricultural model which predicted the agricultural consequences of exercise of
various forms of the dry-year option was developed.   Fifth, a model and literature-based evaluation was
undertaken to arrive at a definition of the term “dry-year option”.  Sixth, the agricultural model was
used to determine willingness to sell water at alternative prices.  Seventh, a regional input-output model
was developed to allow estimates of regional impacts of the dry-year option.  Eighth, the input-output
model was used to estimate the effect of water transfers on local communities, by sector.  Ninth, the
proposal that there should be compensation to third parties was examined.  Tenth, the LP model was
put in a form for delivery to the sponsor and a training workshop was scheduled.  Eleventh, data on the
nonagricultural demand for water were developed.
Research background
To deal with drought, there is a need for an efficient and effective mechanism to transfer water
from lower to higher valued uses.  In the Western United States, water is marketed.  However,
marketing of water generally transfers the water rights in perpetuity with higher valued usages receiving
water rights regardless of the quantity of water available.  There is a need for short term transfers due to
the magnitude of the fluctuation in water supplies.  For example, Edwards Aquifer data contains
historical variation in surface water induced recharge from 50,000 to over 2 million acre feet per year. 
In the face of such fluctuation, entities which require a relatively constant amount of water across all
years may find themselves short on water in dry-years, but with an excess of water in wet years.  Under
such circumstances, it is an economically desirable strategy to transfer water from lower to higher
valued users when water is scarce, but in periods of water abundance to have the water used by lower
valued users (e.g., see the arguments in Colby; McCarl and Parandvash; Michelson and Young; McCarl
et.al.; and Carter, Vaux and Scheuring).
California initiated such a program during the recent drought by using a water bank (Carter,
Vaux, and Scheuring).  The state purchases water from willing sellers, then pools the water and
distributes it to meet the needs.  This is an annual program that is implemented on an as needed basis. 
Colby reviews other cases.  When pursuing such programs major questions arise regarding the
appropriate buying and selling price of water as well as third party effects (Michelson and Young).
Many regions in Texas could support water transfers, but an especially relevant Texas location
where dry-year water transfers could be considered is the Edwards Aquifer region.  That region is one
where demand has been growing steadily for many years, but the amount of aquifer recharge water has
not grown.  The region is also characterized by springflow which supports endangered species. Regional
average annual usage does not now exceed average annual recharge; usage is now about 500,000
2ac/ft/yr while average recharge is in the neighborhood of 630,000 ac/ft/yr and historical springflow
averages 230,000 ac/ft/yr.  However, usage exceeds recharge in many years and certainly long term
prospects for springflow portend a much lower level than the historical average.  Therefore, dry-years
can be a problem both to the current level of usage and the level of springflow.
This situation has led to a number of societal actions.  Various parties, including the Sierra Club
and the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, have initiated legal actions to preserve water for springflow
and base river flow.  The most recent suit based on endangered species was upheld and resultant
management actions are currently in the process of being implemented.  There also has been a long
history regarding the implementation of an aquifer management authority.  Most recently this
culminated in the passage and implementation of legislation where a new management authority was put
into place.   Important issues regarding dry-year water transfer options in the Edwards appear in both
the court monitor’s document for managing the Edwards and in some of the earlier regional aquifer
management plans.  In both cases, dry-year pumping limitations are suggested with triggers based on
recharge, reference well elevation, pumping use, and/or springflow levels.   Thus, the Edwards is a
fruitful area for study of the dry-year water transfer option.
Another piece of the puzzle leading to this research involves the concern directed toward 
agricultural users and springflow quantity.  It is almost certain that in the near future pumping will need
to be curtailed with more water reserved for springflow.  Recent legislation mandates pumping be
reduced to 450,000 acre feet now and 400,000 acre feet by 2008 as opposed to the current level of
about 500,000 acre feet.  Court action has suggested water use restrictions to maintain springflow.  The
resultant water use reduction as well as the possibility of more severe curtailments in dry-years implies a
need for a mechanism to reduce water use in lower valued usages so as to augment springflow.  Often
agricultural water is anecdotally referred to as being worth about $30 to $50 per acre foot, while water
in urban usages, in terms of a tap prices, is valued somewhere in the neighborhood of $500 per acre
foot.  In the face of this differential, agricultural users are likely to respond to economic incentives to
reduce use  (Boggess, Lacewell and Zilberman).  The questions then are: What is the economically
efficient allocation of water?  How could dry-year reductions in agricultural use be facilitated?  At what
cost are springflows augmented?  These are particularly relevant issues as Texas has historically been
under an appropriative system for surface water and a capture system for groundwater. Agricultural
users have historically been using the water for a longer time period in most cases and are, in the
Edwards, “upstream” with the rights of capture.  Thus, transfers between low valued agriculture and
springflow maybe in order, but will not happen without an explicit compensation effort or a new system
of quotas.
In the absence of a market driven mechanism for water allocation,  government often assumes
the allocation responsibility.  Typically, government intervention does not provide efficient management,
while political and legislative forces tend to make allocation decisions without consideration of value of
water in alternative uses.  There is a strong incentive to implement a market driven system (Boggess,
Lacewell and Zilberman; Collinge et.al., McCarl et.al.).
Farmers, when faced with water restrictions or a potential to profitably sell water in any given
3year, can pursue several alternative courses of action.  If the information comes in early enough, crop
mixes can be changed to drought tolerant crops.  If not, then crops can be abandoned or managed using
deficit irrigation approaches.  Furthermore, if a water transfer option is implemented, farmers may make
long term changes in irrigation equipment, and farm capitalization.  Thus, to study the farm welfare
effects of the dry-year option, a comprehensive economic assessment needs to be made wherein factors
such as timing of option, crop mix, deficit irrigation, dryland reversion and irrigation equipment
capitalization are considered.
This research also considers the compensation question.  Actually there are three parties directly
involved in the dry-year option transaction.  These include the farmer who loses income when water is
limited (or must make capital expenditures to improve efficiency), municiple or springflow interests who
gain when more water is made available, and third parties in the farming region who have their
economic well being affected by alterations in farmer activities.  The amount of compensation that will
be paid is bounded below by the loss in farmer profits (or amortized investment to improve efficiency)
and above by the amount of income gained by the nonagricultural water users.  The transactions cost of
bringing the parties together is also relevant. 
Third party or secondary effects may also be relevant.  Historically, compensation for the
transfer of water or other natural resources to agricultural producers has included only the direct
income loss to the owners of the resource.  Examples include the USDA soil bank program of the 1950-
60's and the more recent Conservation Reserve Program wherein crop farmers were paid a net return
per acre equivalent to take land out of production.  In those cases, farmers suffered no economic loss. 
However, communities economically dependent upon crop production suffered business income
reductions, out migration of labor, declines in local property tax bases and other secondary or “third
party” impacts.   Less irrigation will be reflected in a reduction of goods and services used by
production agriculture and less output which has an impact in local and regional economics. 
Compensation for such losses could be undertaken.  Several public entities have provided mitigative
compensation for impacts that policies have had on a local economy beyond the immediate impact on
resource owners.  For example, the Department of Defense considers mitigation payments to
communities affected by military base closures.  Also, the Department of Energy has offered mitigation
payments to communities for radioactive waste disposal.
This research project investigated the question of compensation to third parties from several
viewpoints.  These include:  1) the normative and conceptual considerations involved in the issue of
compensation for secondary impacts of water transfer in dry-years; 2) the analytical techniques needed
for estimating the magnitude of secondary impacts under alternative dry-year option policies; 3) the
procedures for implementing mitigation programs; and 4) the transactions costs and regional economic
impact consequences of mitigation compensation.
Activities and findings
4The research has been separated into eleven tasks.  Here we report activities and results under
each task.
Task 1 -- Development of deficit irrigation data
The estimation of the level of compensation to farmers to cause them to participate in "dry-year
option" requires comparison of net returns among alternative irrigation and management strategies as
well as dryland production.  This requires information on crop yield and crop response to water for
alternative irrigation strategies as well as crop yields for dryland production.  EPIC (Erosion
Productivity Impact Calculator), a biophysical simulation model, was used to simulate crop yield and
irrigation water use for selected crops, vegetables, and hay under alternative irrigation strategies for the
Edwards Aquifer region. EPIC is a process model that runs on a daily time step and simulate the
interaction of soil erosion, plant growth, weather, hydrology, nutrient cycling, tillage, soil temperature,
and economics. The crops and vegetables selected for simulations were corn, cotton, sorghum, oats,
winter-wheat, peanut, cabbage, lettuce, spinach, carrot, cucumber, cantaloupe, and onions. 
The simulations were conducted by using 17 years of actual weather data. From 1951 and 1987
and consist of dry, normal, and wet years. The data was obtained from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
The automatic irrigation feature of EPIC was used to adjust irrigation water use to reflect
weather-induced water availability.  The automatic irrigation feature of EPIC was used where soil
moisture tension triggers irrigation whenever the soil moisture tension is below a level specified by the
user (Kilopascals, 33 to 1500, dependent on crop and strategy).
 A large number of irrigation strategies were formulated for each major crop and vegetable.
These strategies were based on alternative irrigation triggers, alternative irrigation ending dates (April
30, May 30, June 30 etc.), and alternative irrigation methods (furrow and sprinkler).   For cotton, the
irrigation ending dates were based on early bloom (EB), first bloom (FB), and first open boll (FOB)
which correspond to irrigation ending dates of May 31, June 30, and July 31, respectively. Simulations
for dryland production were also conducted. 
For vegetables, simulations were performed for irrigation triggers and irrigation methods
(furrow and sprinkler). Alternative irrigation ending dates were not used for vegetables since vegetables
require full season irrigation.
      Application amounts of 4.0 and 1.5 inches of water were used for furrow and sprinkler
irrigation, respectively.  Irrigation efficiency was assumed to be 70% and 95% for furrow and sprinkler
irrigation, respectively, implying that for furrow irrigation, 30% of the water was lost through runoff,
evaporation, and/or percolation, whereas only 5% was lost under sprinkler irrigation. To simulate crop
yield, EPIC also requires other data on fertilizer and pesticide/herbicide use, tillage, as well as other
site-specific information. These information were obtained from the Texas Crop Enterprise Budgets.
       As hay is harvested many times throughout the year, simulations for hay were based on fraction
5of growing season.  EPIC was allowed to schedule management operations according to the fraction of
crop maturity rather than calendar date. Heat units (thermal time) were used to estimate the rate of crop
development, and the fraction of crop maturity in a specific day is expressed as the number of heat units
accumulated to that day divided by the number of heat units required for crop maturity.
    
    The simulation results on crop yield and water use are incorporated in the data section of the
GAMS code for the Edwards Aquifer economic model which readers can request from the authors. 
Task 2 -- Budget development
Budgets giving per acre costs were obtained from the Texas Crop Enterprise Budgets largely
from the Southwest Texas District, as produced by the Texas Agricultural Extension Service.  Net
returns by cropping system and weather year were developed based on the crop budgets, simulated crop
yields, and crop price projections from several national policy studies.  This provided baseline data for
budgeting analysis and the necessary inputs for developing a regional economic model.  Certain cost
items were separated out from the budgets which were yield and/or irrigation water dependent.  Their
usage was changed as the irrigation strategies (and thereby yield and water application) were altered.
Task 3 -- Development of a regional level agricultural model
Numerous cropping pattern and irrigation strategies exist in the region that can be used to react
to the dry-year option.  The second task involved development of an agricultural, net income
maximizing, linear programming model to simulate farmer decision making.  This model includes the
major field, hay and vegetable crops in the region grouped by county and includes crop mix decisions,
deficit irrigation decisions, irrigation type decisions (sprinkler/furrow) and dryland use decisions for
three pump lift zones.  The model is designed to simulate short run, within season adjustments, to the
dry-year water transfer option as well as medium term adjustments in crop mix and long term
adjustments in crop mix and irrigation equipment. 
Notable efforts involved in setting up this model included:
a) An earlier model of the Edwards Aquifer was adapted (McCarl et al.)
b) Lift zones were added
c) Numerous irrigation schedules based on the EPIC data were added
d) Sprinkler versus furrow irrigation features were added.
Task 4 -- Definition of the dry-year option
The project required a definition of  a “dry-year option”.  Two investigations were done to help
develop an operational dry-year option definition.  First, a related model which included industrial,
municipal, and agricultural usage was used to develop data on potential frequency of interrupted water
use by agriculture.  This was done by looking at year 2000 demand under a 450,000 ac ft water limit,
with agriculture operating unilaterally, maximizing profits and then later agriculture operating in
conjunction with municipal and industrial interests in a cooperative fashion.  In turn the difference
6observed between agricultural water use when it cooperated and when it did not was observed to
determine the percentage of the years that agriculture might be cut back.  The water use comparison is
shown by the graph in Figure 1, and this revealed that 48% of the time agriculture used less than it
would under a unilateral free capture setup.  We used a 48% frequency in our study of midyear option
exercises.  
A parallel project by Rothe developed a definition of the dry-year option in which water use was
interrupted not based on how dry the year was, but based on the initial elevation of the aquifer at the
beginning of the year.  Rothe also assumed that water gained through the option would be dedicated to
springflow.  We then decided to examine of the dry-year option by first indicating that the water could
be bought from agriculture, but that water would be dedicated to springflow and not put into non
agricultural usages.  Second, we considered beginning of year and mid-crop year timing for option
exercise.  The mid-crop year option, because of the availability of simulated data on irrigation strategies,
will involve interruption of any ongoing agricultural usage of water beyond the 1st of June when the
dry-year option is implemented.  Further, this will occur either in all years or just in the 48% driest
years, i.e., itis conceivable that the option might come into play when we had relatively low elevations at
the beginning of the year and the year turned out to be dry.  
Given Rothe’s definition that the water will not be transferred by the dry-year option, but will be
allowed to go into springflow, we concentrated on the agricultural and springflow effects.  See Task 11
for nonagricultural data.  
Task 5 -- Development of a model of springflow impacts
If the water diverted is dedicated to springflow, it is desirable to examine how springflow
responds to agricultural water use reductions.  This was done using regression equations derived from
repeatedly running the Texas Water Development Board’s GWBSIM IV model.  Equations were
estimated for monthly and annual flows at Comal and San Marcos springs as a function of water use;
initial elevation both from east and west pools; and recharge.  The annual regressions are given in Table
1.  The monthly regressions which predict springflow are in the model code.  A related paper by
Keplinger and McCarl discusses the regression results at more length.  Keplinger investigated the
validity of the forecasts and shows that the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients derived from
historic data are very close to those from the GWBSIM based regressions.
 
The GWBSIM IV and regression results influenced our study design.  First, they showed a
differential response based on pumping location.  This led us to estimate the equations with respect to
east and west pumping with east pumping occurring in Medina, Bexar, Hayes, and Comal counties and
west occurring in Uvalde and Kinney counties.  The regressions then revealed a dramatic difference in
response based on whether the withdrawal was in the east or west.  This led us to examine separate dry-
year options for eastern and western counties.  Our data examination also led us to focus on two
measures of springflow — Annual and August quantity.
Task 6 -- Analysis of farm and springflow reactions to dry-year option
7The dry-year farm based analysis examined what farmers would do at various offer prices, when
prices are based on either an offer before the planting season, perhaps in late November, or an offer that
arises to terminate irrigation.  A similar program terminating water use June 1 was also examined. 
Finally, in the June 1 exercise context, we examined an offer announced in November which would only
occur 48% of the time, i.e., when the annual recharge was less than 500,000 ac ft.
 The model was applied assuming :
a) exercise of water transfer options before the crop year (allowing farmers to establish
crop mixes knowing water availability) 
b) implementation of a mid-year option with agricultural water use cessation June 1 and
thereafter assuming the crop mix was implemented without assuming the dry-year option
will be implemented.  The interruption happens regardless of recharge.
c) implementation of the mid-year option with agricultural water use cessation June 1 and
thereafter, assuming the crop mix has been implemented in January with knowledge that
the option will occur under dry-years, and that water use is interrupted, for dry recharge
years only (42% of the time based on the frequency of years with under 500,000 ac ft of
recharge).
The analysis was run with the offer for compensation made to only eastern counties, basically
Bexar and Medina or to western counties (Uvalde and Kinney), although the Uvalde portion was only
considered for the November offer case.  The analysis was done with the offer prices from $0-150 an
acre. 
Figures 2-5 show the basic results while tables 2-5 summarize them.  When one announces a
dry-year option in the eastern counties in November, low offer prices of around $10 /ac yield as much
as 10,000 ac ft of water use reduction.  On the other hand, when one does this in Uvalde, the offer price
has to be somewhere around $60 /ac before any meaningful conversion occurs.  Most of the buy out
effectiveness occurs in both counties at an offer of $90/ac.  The cost of the water saved by the buy out
becomes substantially more expensive if one interrupts in the middle of the cropping season as prices
somewhere around $90/ac need to be paid to get about half as much water as could be gotten under
other circumstances.  Other interpretations of the results appear in the paper by Keplinger et al. (and the
thesis by Keplinger). 
There are significant springflow implications depending on whether the water use reduction is in
the east or the west counties as shown in Figures 4 and 5.  For roughly the same amount of water taken
out of production, you get several times the springflow if eastern water use is curtailed.  Additional
technical data surrounding these results appear in Tables 2-8. 
Task 7 -- Input-output model of counties
8In order to investigate the compensation questions, input-output models were developed for the
counties that have significant agricultural acreage, namely Bexar, Medina, Uvalde and that part of
Kinney which draws from the Edwards Aquifer. In addition, a regional input-output model was
developed including all these counties. Thes  models were set up so that the individual crops from the
ASM model were aggregated into the appropriate IMPLAN sectors for cotton, feed grains, food grains,
oilseeds, vegetables, and other agricultural crops. IMPLAN sectors are aggregations of US Department
of Commerce Standard Industrial Classification codes.  
Input-output analysis provides a method for estimating the secondary impacts on the county and
regional economies that derive from adjustments made in irrigated acreage and other changes in
agricultural sectors as a result of imposing the dry-year option.  Input-output models have been used
widely elsewhere to estimate the secondary or third party impacts of resource management changes
(Hazen and Sawyer). While there are alternative input-output models available, this project used the
proprietary IMPLAN software package program because of its timely data base and flexibility for
developing regional models. The IMPLAN model is maintained and periodically updated by a
commercial company, (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc.).   Software and data bases are available for
purchase from this company.(Feldman and Gilbard)
IMPLAN was used to estimate input-output relationships for the individual counties and an
aggregation of counties in the Edwards Aquifer region.   Secondary impacts were estimated in terms of:
(1) total industry output, (2) wage and salary income, (3) employment, (4) total income, (5)
employment and (6) total value added. 
Input-output multipliers for each of these variables for each county and the Edwards Aquifer
region as a whole are presented in Appendix A. Results as to the estimated magnitude of secondary
impacts arising from alternative, potential agricultural water management scenarios are presented in the
following section.
Task 8 -- Investigate compensation mechanisms for secondary impacts
Results on gross revenue from selected irrigated and non-irrigated sectors were taken from the
farm model solutions analyzing the November dry-year option.  The differencesin gross r venue by
sector for each county with and without payments for the dry-year option at different compensation
levels were analyzed.  The values of production from each agricultural sector in the non-dry-year, free
capture scenario were used as the baseline gross revenue estimates. Then, gross revenues were
estimated under several dry-year option prices and gross revenue differences were estimated for each
agricultural sector. These differences (reductions in revenues) were used to estimate the secondary
impacts on the regional and county economies. 
Estimated secondary impacts may be viewed as the levels of compensation required to offset the
negative economic effects on third parties that result from imposing the dry-year option. No attempts
were made to estimate any of the positive economic effects that may arise from the use of water saved
in the aquifer by imposing the dry-year option and potentially utilized beneficially elsewhere.
8.1 Estimated magnitude of secondary compensation
9Three assumptions were made relative to the source and disposition of compensation when the
dry-year option is implemented.  
1)Compensation when paid goes to agricultural producers in proportion to the valueof their
total output and this was drawn from local tax payers in the four county 
area.  
2)Compensation goes to agricultural producers in proportion to their output, but that the
compensation was drawn from outside the region, i.e., external sources such as federal
government, the State of Texas and/or private parties who benefit from the water made
available with the imposition of the dry-year option. 
3)Compensation will be spent entirely outside the region having no effect on the local economy.
(This scenario is analogous to achieving the same acreage reductions as in (1) and (2)
without payment to farmers).
In addition, secondary impacts were estimated for two scenarios that rely on administrative rather than
market approaches with a related model (McCarl et al). These were:
4)A maximum aquifer withdrawal limit of 450,000 ac ft per year, and
5)A minimum springflow of 150,000 ac ft per year.  
Each of these assumptions was investigated for the different compensation levels assumed in the
earlier sections of this report. Specifically reported in this section are compensation levels of $10, $60
and $90 per acre for a November implementation. Separate estimates were made for the three aquifer
recharge levels during the growing season -  wet, medium and dry rainfall conditions.
Summaries of the secondary (third party) impacts of these scenarios are presented in Tables 9
through 12 for the whole region, Uvalde, Medina and Bexar counties, respectively. Each table shows
the secondary impacts of eleven scenarios of the dry-year option. The interpretation of individual
estimates are identical among the tables presented. For example, scenario 1.2 in Table 9 shows the
estimated impacts on the Edwards Aquifer Area of a $60 per acre payment to farmers for irrigated
acreage reduction. In this scenario, it is estimated that regional shipments to final demand (consumers,
exports from the region, etc.) would fall by $26.2 million, total industrial output by $32.54 million,
employee income by $8.1 million, property income by $9.88 million, and total income by almost $18
million. Regional value added would fall by $19.6 million and total regional employment would fall by
487 jobs. 
As expected, impacts from the local tax fund assumption are greater than those estimated under
outside funds/local expenditures. Estimated regional impacts under local taxation are about the same as
those under outside funds/outside expenditures, which assumes that farmers receive no payments for
acreage reductions. 
This result is not unexpected since payments to farmers from within the region would
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necessarily reduce government spending elsewhere within the economy or require tax increases.
Secondary impacts from these alternatives are evidently about the same.
Estimates for the administrative alternatives (450,000 ac ft per year pumpage and 150,000 ac ft
per year springflow) are also shown in Table 1. Comparisons between these scenarios and the market
oriented scenarios ( 1 - 3) are not meaningful because reductions in irrigation and gross revenues from
crops may not be comparable.
Estimated economic impacts for Uvalde, Medina and Bexar counties are shown in Tables 10-12.
The values relating to each scenario and economic variable may be interpreted in the manner as those in
Table 9 except that the impacts in each county table are limited to the economy of that county. Since
leakages occur among counties in the region, the aggregation of individual county estimates for a given
scenario and economic variable may give a larger value than that estimated for the region using the
regional input-output model.
A comparison among counties shows that the secondary economic impacts fall greatest on
Uvalde and Medina counties (Tables 10 and 11). Secondary impacts are much less in Bexar county and
only exist at payment levels above $90. Estimated impacts were so small in Kinney county that they are
not shown separately. Kinney county is included in the regional input-output model for the entire
Edwards Aquifer area.
Value added is the most appropriate economic variable upon which to base a compensation
program. Value added is an estimate of the returns to locally employed resources  (land, labor, capital
and management) throughout the regional or county economies. Under local taxation, value added
losses to the region ranged from a low of $4.9 million for a payment level of $10 per acre to a high of
$36.75 million for a payment level of $90 per acre (Table 9). Compensation in these amounts would
approximately offset the losses to the regional economy because of the implementation of the dry-year
option.
8.2 Alternative mechanisms of secondary impact compensation
Compensation methods or mechanisms may vary widely.  A review of alternative cases is
instructive in terms of outlining policy options.  In the low level radioactive waste facility citing work in
Texas in the 1980’s, consideration was given to cash payments to county, school and city governments
(Jones et al 1993).  Similar approaches have been considered in terms of military base closings (Jones et
al 1994).  In the case of the Everglades restoration project, several potential secondary impact
mitigation or compensation mechanisms were considered, including job retraining and placement for
displaced workers (Hazen & Sawyer). In other cases that involve government actions to limit the
commercial use of a natural resource, compensation has taken several forms. In 1978, the US Congress
passed The Redwood National Park Expansion Act. This Act used the power of eminent domain to take
a significant part the remaining merchantable inventory of old growth redwood timber in California.
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This act affected directly industrial forest firms in the area. As compensation, the US Treasury paid just
compensation that included the value of timber and severance damages for the loss of economic
usefulness of mills, roads, etc. Further, secondary impacts were compensated by paying employees
affected by the land acquisition. Employees totally or partially laid off because of the Act were entitled
to all employment rights and benefits; pensions and welfare trust funds; layoff and vacation replacement
benefits; and retraining at the expense of the US Government during a period of protection (Berck and
Bentley).
In a more recent case involving the Northern Spotted Owl listing as an endangered species, the
Bureau of Land Management developed a program to provide grants and benefit payments to
communities and employees who were economically dependent on National Forest System lands and
public lands administered by the BLM. The objectives of this program were: 1) to assist communities in
achieving economic diversity and decreased dependency on forest products; 2) to supplement
unemployment insurance benefits and extend income maintenance payments; 3) to provide short and
long term retraining; 4) to provide base level health care insurance; and 5) to defray job search and
relocation expenses (US Department of Interior). 
Numerous other individual cases could be cited that used various mechanisms to provide
compensation to third parties that result from public policy implementation that reduces the commercial
use of a natural resource important to the regional economy. In general, compensation programs have
focused on payments to communities and to employees that are displaced by the public policy. As is
discussed in the following section, many of these compensation programs appear to have been put in
place to reduce opposition to the policy and to ease the process of implementation. 
A major difference exists between the dry-year option and the programs used as examples in this
section. It is expected that the dry-year option will be an intermittent event and cause temporary
displacements, whereas the cases cited above caused permanent displacements of economic activity.
Implementation of the dry-year option would be expected to reduce irrigated acreage only in that year
with a return to normal conditions in the following year in most cases. Hence, the need to provide
compensation to third parties would be limited to losses only when they occur, usually one year.
Task 9 -- Compensation and the dry-year option
One other item meritorious of discussion regarding compensation relates to who should be
compensated. Impact models are normally used to estimate secondary impacts of a policy change, 
economic structural shift, new industry location, or other events.  Secondary impact estimates are
typically used to anticipate and aid in planning for regional economic and social changes brought about
by the event.  Estimates of negative secondary impacts do not imply that compensation must be
undertaken.  Three aspects of the compensation question merit discussion:  Is compensation in order?,
What amount of compensation arises to third parties?, and, Who are the third parties? All these
questions will be discussed below.
9.1 Is compensation in order?
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There are three arguments on whether compensation to non-farm entities is in order.  
First, history seems to indicate that compensation to third parties affected by a specific
economic change is rare.  We, as a society, have not chosen to compensate rural areas for public policy
changes in most cases. Agriculture programs such as the Soil Bank of the 1960’s and the Conservation
Reserve Program of the 1990’s had significant local economic impacts on food and fiber processing
plants, input suppliers, communities and other sectors. While farmers were paid to participate in these
programs and remove land from production, no compensation was offered to impacted third parties.
We have never required, as a public policy, private owners of assets to compensate a local area
when a privately owned asset was closed or its economic use suspended.  For example, over the last
one hundred years, technological developments in the agricultural and industrial sectors have created
mass migrations of people from rural areas to urban areas with no attempt made to compensate the
rural areas.  Furthermore, when businesses close they have not been required to compensate for the
secondary benefits that are lost in the area. The economic argument against compensation has been that
resources are mobile and, if displaced due to a policy or technological change, they will find
employment elsewhere.
Second, classical economic theory indicates that estimating the appropriate level of
compensation within the context of a particular event is difficult.  The reason for this is that secondary
benefits (costs), while potentially a valid welfare account, are likely offset by secondary costs (benefits)
elsewhere. In the dry-year option case, benefit and costs would arise elsewhere by: a) more water being
in the springs, b) more water flowing in the rivers downstream, c) sustained endangered species, d)
more water available for urban uses, and e) production increases in other areas that replace crop
production that ordinarily would have happened in the Edwards area, as well as other benefits. 
Generally, this compensation question has always been judged too difficult to handle in order to fully
account and develop a rational basis for compensation. 
 Closely related to this problem is the question of the appropriate source of revenue for
compensation. For example, let’s assume that property taxes must be increased in the area to raise funds
for compensation to farmers and third parties. Since increases in property taxes will reduce property
values, ceteris paribus, are the owners of assets upon which the tax is imposed also due compensation? 
Of course, this question is not limited to property tax increases for compensation revenue.  In fact, it
could be asked of any revenue transfer program.
Third, consideration of an alternative view of compensation to injured third parties may be
beneficial in analyzing the dry-year option. This view is based more on a strategy for policy
implementation rather than on the traditional evaluation of whether or not third party compensation is
justifiable from a social efficiency standpoint. In the past,  in cases where the government action brings
about an undesirable change in a region, or in some way injures third parties and consequently may be
expected to face resistance, compensation has been judged appropriate. For example, in actions on the
siting of a hazardous waste facility or closing of a military base, the federal government has engaged in
payments and other forms of mitigation to the region to offset secondary economic losses. Moreover,
the State of Texas has offered compensation to third parties in the case of the location of low level
radioactive waste storage facilities ( Jones, et al.). The purpose of these payments appears to be not an
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attempt to achieve efficiency or equity in policy actions, but rather an attempt to increase the
acceptability of the action and reduce the transactions costs and time of implementation of the policy. In
most cases, compensation has been made to certain governing bodies of the impacted region. No
attempt has been made to make direct compensatory payments to owners of resources that become
unemployed as a result of the action.
Compensation to third parties is fraught with difficulties, including decisions as to who should
be compensated and by how much. Nevertheless, setting aside the philosophical question of social
efficiency, compensation to third parties may be viewed as a practical policy tool that may reduce local
resistance and the transaction costs of implementing a public policy. 
Numerous recent cases may be cited in which the question of third party impacts has dominated
the debate over environmental policy to the extent that implementation has been significantly delayed
and policies have been changed. Two of these will suffice. First, the program to protect the Spotted
Owl in the northwestern United States became embroiled in extreme controversy because of its effect
on logging, sawmills, rural communities, jobs and income to rural residents in the impact area. The
second case involves the restoration of the Florida Everglades which would have an affect on sugarcane
producers in South Florida, reduce the amount of land in production and spin-off secondary impacts in
the communities where sugarcane production is the primary economic base for the region.
In both these cases, and in others similar, the delayed implementation, high cost of legal and
consultant services and other costs significantly affected the overall transaction costs and effectiveness
of the programs to address their intended purposes. The development of a program for third party
payments may have been feasible in these and/or other public programs. If used as an implementation
tool, then third party payments should be evaluated on a cost/benefit basis and used to the extent that
the monetary value of the compensation is less than the expected transactions cost if no compensation is
made. 
In the case of the Edwards Aquifer, proposed programs for changing underground water
allocation to anything but absolute capture have generally been met with resistance. Implementing the
dry-year option will likely be no exception. Any policy to reallocate water may be expected to be
viewed as an undesirable policy in the areas where water use is reduced. In this case, third party
compensation may be feasible in terms of the cost of implementation.
9.2 What amount of compensation could be paid to third parties?
Beyond the question of whether or not third party payments should be made lies the question of
how much should payments be. The dry-year option differs from the compensation experiences cited
above in at least one significant feature. That is, the reallocation of water would be a periodic, annual
event rather than a permanent change in water use. Hence, compensation would be due third parties
only in the year in which the dry-year option is triggered and the amount of compensation would be
limited only to annual, temporary losses to third parties. 
 One criterion for third party compensation could be to gauge the amount of compensation
against the loss of regional benefits from the employment of local resources that results from the dry-
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year option. Specifically, an annual reallocation of water that reduces its use in agricultural irrigation
would further reduce the employment of land, capital, labor and management resources where the
reductions occur. The input-output model provides an estimate of this reduction under an aggregate
title of Value Added. Value added losses due to the reallocation are estimated by county and sector of
the economy and show the estimated loss in returns to land, capital, labor and management within the
region. The estimate includes not only the losses from resource unemployment in irrigated agriculture,
but also the secondary value added losses to input suppliers, processors, and other related, third party
sectors in the economy. 
9.3 Who are the third parties?
Typically, policy initiatives that consider third party compensation, focus on replacing potential
lost revenue for taxing jurisdictions such as schools, county governments, municipalities and special
taxing districts. Mechanisms called “payments in lieu of taxes” have been used to compensate public
entities in cases where a public facility exists that is tax exempt by law but creates an increase in demand
for public services, expenditures and revenue needs. Examples include military bases, public utility
generating plants and other similar entities that use and cause an increase in demand for public services
but cannot be taxed by local jurisdictions. This mechanism would seem to have limited applicability in
the dry-year option program since no physical facilities would be put in place that would stimulate an
increase the need for public spending. Moreover, underground water withdrawn from the aquifer for
whatever reason is not taxed directly. Compensation would not, therefore, be in lieu of taxes.
9.3.1 Impacts on public jurisdictions
A program of payments to public jurisdictions (county, cities and schools) to replace lost taxes
because of reduced agricultural production could be considered.
However, the temporary and intermittent nature of the dry-year option, combined with the tax laws
relating to agricultural production, suggest that tax losses to jurisdictions in the Edwards area should be
minimal if they exist at all. 
Tax losses to local jurisdictions would occur only if the dry-year option program caused changes
that reduced their most important tax bases. Counties and city governments and school districts depend
primarily on property taxes for revenue. Counties and cities also depend to varying degrees on sales
taxes. However, implementation of the dry-year option is expected to have little or no affect on either
of these tax bases because of special treatment given to farmers and ranchers under Texas tax laws.
First, both production inputs purchased and commodity sales made by farmers and ranchers are exempt
from state and local sales taxes. Federal and state fuel taxes are also exempted. Hence, even if
purchased inputs, such as seed, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation equipment, etc. are reduced in the dry-
year implementation period, there would be no loss in sales taxes since none are paid in the non-dry-
years.
In the case of property taxes, farmers and ranchers again receive special treatment under Texas
law. The Open Space land valuation law (see Article VIII, Sec. 1-d-1, TX. Const.) was incorporated
15
into the Texas Constitution in 1980. This law allows qualifying land to be taxed on its agricultural
productivity value rather than its market value as is other property. The taxable value of farm and ranch
land is estimated using a capitalization formula that considers only the agricultural returns to land along
with a capitalization rate that is also determined by law. The result of this law is that virtually all land
used for agricultural production in Texas (over 95 percent) is qualified and taxed on productivity value
rather than market value.
Productivity value is typically significantly less than market value. For example, the productivity
values and market values of irrigated cropland in Uvalde and Medina counties are compared as follows
(Turner):
Uvalde Medina
Market Value ($/acre) 713 1250
Productivity Value ($/acre) 308   413
Under Texas productivity valuation rules, the productivity value cannot exceed the market
value.  Hence, to have an affect on revenues of taxing jurisdictions the dry-year option program would
have to cause market values of irrigated cropland to fall below the productivity value. Moreover, since
landowners receive payments for participating in the program, these payments would be a consideration
in any irrigated land sales so that the impact on market values should be minimal. Hence, farmers and
ranchers would pay taxes based on productivity value in the dry-year just like any other year without
any affect on the taxing jurisdictions.
In sum, there appears to be no reason to expect that the local taxing jurisdictions in the areas
where farmers choose to participate in the dry-year option would be impacted. The participation
payments should offset any losses from reduced irrigated acreage that might affect the market values of
land. Further, even if market values were to decline, it is not likely that the decline would be sufficient
to cause a shift in the farmland tax base from productivity value to market value.
9.3.2 Private businesses and individuals
Reducing irrigated acreage in the Edwards may affect a number of businesses and individuals
either directly or indirectly related to irrigated crop production. Most directly impacted would be farm
labor, businesses that supply productive inputs (mainly irrigation equipment and supplies), agricultural
services, and possibly farmers who lease land from owners for irrigated crop production. 
9.3.3 Farm labor
Irrigated crop production is more labor intensive than dryland crop or livestock production.
Hence, it is expected that implementing the dry-year option would displace farm workers in the year in
which irrigated acreage is reduced. Compensation may be in order for these farm workers since their
income loss is directly related to the dry-year policy implementation. A program of temporary
compensation would be consistent with that suggested by Berck and Hazen and Sawyer.
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9.3.4 Cash and share leases
Some of the irrigated agricultural production in the Edwards region is carried out by farmers
who do not own the land they farm. Leasing of farmland is a common practice. Typically, landowners
(lessors) and farm operators (lessees) enter into agreements that state the terms of the lease which may
be based on a cash payment per year or on a share to the production earned during the year. 
In a cash lease, the landowner typically provides the land and irrigation well and pays property
taxes. The lessee provides the variable inputs, farming equipment (capital), labor and management. The
amount of cash lease going to the landowner reflects the return to land after all other inputs to
production have been paid.
 
Obviously, a share lease, while variable in nature, is expected to yield about the same return to
the landowner as the cash lease. There is a potential for losses of income by lessees depending upon the
per acre amount of the offer made to landowners to temporarily take their irrigated land out of
production. Landowners who lease out their land would be attracted by any offer that is greater than
the amount of the cash lease offered by lessees or the expected amount of returns to land from a share
lease. If these landowners enter the program, the lessee loses the opportunity for employment of the
productive resources contributed by the lease. The amount of the lessee’s loss in one year would be the
expected returns to labor, capital and management. 
Owner operators, those who farm their own land, would likely consider the unemployment
consequences of resources other than land that they own. Consequently, they would require an offer to
participate in the dry-year program that is sufficiently large to cover expected returns to land plus
returns to fixed capital, operator and family labor and management (Michelson and Young).
This potential third party loss may be avoided in at least two ways. These are: (1) setting the
participation bid price sufficiently high to cover the returns to all resources employed in irrigation
production; and (2) requiring that both lessors and lessees participate in the benefits of the participation
offers. This approach should be equally attractive to owner-operators, landowners and farmers who rent
land for irrigated production.
9.3.5 Farm supply and service businesses
A variety of businesses in the Edwards Aquifer area are established and operate to serve the
needs of farmers and ranchers. These include farm implement and equipment companies, irrigation
equipment suppliers, input supply companies, and custom service operations to name a few. The dry-
year option could impact these businesses as farmers reduce their use of purchased inputs, use less
services, and delay investments in machinery and equipment. For most purchases that farmers make, the
local businesses earn a wholesale and/or retail margin from the sale of inputs, machinery and equipment
that is manufactured outside the region. In dry-years, businessmen who supply farmers would be
expected to make reductions in orders of materials, equipment and other items purchased for resale
during the production year. In this case, the loss to local businesses is limited to the reduced wholesale
and retail margins foregone because of reduced sales to farmers who participate in the program. Also,
these businesses may cut back on employees. This would reduce personal income in the locale and have
17
subsequent impacts on retail sales, business and personal service businesses, banks and other businesses
that depend primarily upon the local markets for sales of their goods and services.  This impact may
also affect local and state sales tax revenues.
9.3.6 Speciality production and marketing systems
Within the Edwards Aquifer region, there exist a variety of speciality agricultural production and
marketing systems that are integrated or coordinated by use of contracts from production to final
consumer. These systems focus primarily on vegetable production and corn for human consumption. 
These systems typically serve “niche” or speciality markets, unlike major field crops that sell
commodities into a national market. An important ingredient in a coordinated, speciality system is the
dependability of supply for specific consumer markets such as restaurants and brand name products.
Should the irrigated acreage serving these systems be reduced within the area, adjustments would need
to be made elsewhere to sustain the supply of products and efficient alternatives may be limited. 
9.4 Compension - concluding comments
The dry-year option program presents questions relative to third party payments that are quite
different from previous public programs adopted to manage natural resources. At this time, it  is
expected that implementation of the dry-year option will be a temporary, annual event which should
serve to minimize the impacts on private third parties and on public service providers. The magnitude of
these intermittent impacts will depend upon the amount of irrigated land that enters the dry-year option
program and leaves production in a given year. 
Of course, the loss of one year’s business can be a severe impact for some businesses, but not as
severe as the permanent removal of land or other resources as is the case in most previous natural
resource management programs.
Task 10 -- Delivery of models
Several assumptions were made in order to examine consequences of the dry-year option, some
of which may not be absolutely in accord with the way the dry-year option is eventually set up and/or
there may be alternative ways that the agricultural producers might respond.  Thus, we have developed
a transportable version of the farm economic model in which assumptions may be modified. 
We are prepared to deliver a disk copy of the model including all related files to those interested
for a nominal fee. However, we cannot deliver the input-output model, just the multipliers as we are
contractually obligated by the IMPLAN developers to not redistribute the software.  We certainly can
make available the procedures for the aggregation and analysis to those who own IMPLAN.
Task 11 -- Municipal and industrial demand
Water released by the dry-year option can conceivably be used to allow greater usage by
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nonagricultural users.  We generated a municipal and industry-only model to determine how much
water municipal and industrial interests would buy using the same pumping lifts as in the agricultural
model.  The water price was varied above pumping costs from $0-500.  This yielded observations for
each recharge year as well as average results.  Table 13 gives the amount of recharge and the
probability of each of the recharge years, while Table 14 gives the usage in an average year and the
usage in each of the recharge years.  As can be seen from the table, water use varied from 336,482 acre
feet when water was not priced (a zero price was used) to 132,508 ac/ft when a $500 charge was used. 
Also note higher water usage occurred under the drier years and lower water usage in the wetter years.
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Recharge Year Arrayed from Low  to High
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l 
W
a
te
r 
U
se
1956 1951 1963 1969 1980 1974 1978 1968 1967
Free Capture Cooperative
19
Figure 1. Difference between irrigated acreage in free capture versus cooperative context
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Table 1.  Regression coefficients for current year Comal and San Marcos springflow, and J17
and Sabinal index well ending elevations.
Comal San Marcos Ending Ending
Springflow Springflow Elevation Elevation
(acre feet) (acre feet)
J17 Sabinal
       (feet above sea level)
J17 Starting Elevation 2,651 412 0.54 0.35
  (feet above sea level)
Sabinal Starting Elevation  551 0.0 0.16 0.58
(feet above sea level)
Annual Recharge (acre feet) 0.080 0.024 0.000019 0.000024
Western Pumping (acre feet) -0.04 -0.0005 -0.000028 -0.000091
Eastern Pumping (acre feet) -0.28 -0.025 -0.000136 -0.000059
Intercept -1924677 -203976 210 102
R-Square 0.93 0.77 0.95 0.96
010
20
30
40
50
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Offer Price ( $ )
A
cr
e
s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
Jan 1 Cutoff - West Jan 1 Cutoff - East
June 1 Cutoff, Unanticipated - East June 1 Cutoff, Anticipated - East
-10
0
10
20
30
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Month
A
cr
e
 F
e
e
t
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Jan 1 Cutoff - East June 1 Cutoff, Unanticipated - East
June 1 Cutoff, Anticipated - East
21
Figure 2. Agricultural irrigated land use reduction by dry-year option scenario
Figure 3. Agricultural water use reduction by dry-year option scenario
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Figure 4.  Comal springflow increase by dry-year option scenario
Figure 5. Water use reduction and springflow increase
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Table 2. Response to offer price of implementing a dry-year option: January 1st cutoff - Uvalde and Kinney counties.
     Type of Land Use      Irrigation Water   Springflow Response     Agricultural Income Cost of Program
Offer Irrigated Amount of Total Comal From       Cost of Water  Cost of
Springflow
Price Total Furrow Sprinkler Dryland Applied Reduction Current Yr. August Total Operation Total Average Marginal Marginal Average
($) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (AF) (AF) (AF) (CFS) ($) ($) ($) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF)
0 41,560 28,357 13,203 0 104,516 0 0 0.00 2,813,701 2,813,701 0 0 inf. inf. 0
10 41,560 28,357 13,203 0 104,551 0 0 0.00 2,813,707 2,813,707 0 0 inf. inf. 0
20 41,560 28,357 13,203 0 104,551 0 0 0.00 2,813,707 2,813,707 0 0 inf. inf. 0
30 41,560 28,357 13,203 0 104,551 0 0 0.00 2,813,707 2,813,707 0 0 inf. inf. 0
40 41,560 28,357 13,203 0 104,551 0 0 0.00 2,813,707 2,813,707 0 0 inf. inf. 0
50 41,560 28,357 13,203 0 104,551 0 0 0.00 2,813,707 2,813,707 0 0 inf. inf. 0
60 23,941 10,738 13,203 17,618 54,895 49,621 2,789 5.55 3,168,235 2,111,155 1,057,080 93 93 379 379
70 23,941 10,738 13,203 17,618 54,895 49,621 2,789 5.55 3,344,415 2,111,155 1,233,260 109 inf. inf. 442
80 23,941 10,738 13,203 17,618 54,895 49,621 2,789 5.55 3,520,595 2,111,155 1,409,440 124 inf. inf. 505
90 3,265 0 3,265 38,294 6,092 98,424 5,507 10.93 4,550,983 1,104,523 3,446,460 153 214 879 626
100 3,265 0 3,265 38,294 6,092 98,424 5,507 10.93 4,933,923 1,104,523 3,829,400 170 inf. inf. 695
110 234 0 234 41,326 448 104,068 5,812 11.53 5,483,934 938,074 4,545,860 191 851 3,610 782
120 0 0 0 41,560 0 104,516 5,836 11.58 5,908,681 921,481 4,987,200 208 4,304 18,194 855
130 0 0 0 41,560 0 104,516 5,836 11.58 6,324,281 921,481 5,402,800 226 inf. inf. 926
140 0 0 0 41,560 0 104,516 5,836 11.58 6,739,881 921,481 5,818,400 243 inf. inf. 997
150 0 0 0 41,560 0 104,516 5,836 11.58 7,155,481 921,481 6,234,000 260 inf. inf. 1,068
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Table 3. Response to offer price of implementing a dry-year option :  January 1st cutoff - Medina and Bexar counties
.
Type of Land Use Irrigation Water Springflow Response     Agricultural Income Cost of Program
Offer Irrigated Amount of Total Comal From       Cost of Water  Cost of
Springflow
Price Total Furrow Sprinkler Dryland Applied Reduction Current Yr. August Total Operation Total Average Marginal Marginal Average
($) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (AF) (AF) (AF) (CFS) ($) ($) ($) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF)
0 38,332 26,982 11,350 0 94,397 0 0 0.00 1,374,515 1,374,515 0 0 inf. inf. 0
10 24,447 13,097 11,350 13,885 57,385 37,011 15,034 28.25 1,602,128 1,463,278 138,850 4 4 9 9
20 24,447 13,097 11,350 13,885 57,385 37,011 15,034 28.25 1,740,978 1,463,278 277,700 8 inf. inf. 18
30 24,447 13,097 11,350 13,885 57,385 37,011 15,034 28.25 1,879,828 1,463,278 416,550 11 inf. inf. 28
40 24,447 13,097 11,350 13,885 57,385 37,011 15,034 28.25 2,018,678 1,463,278 555,400 15 inf. inf. 37
50 3,531 0 3,531 34,801 6,737 87,660 35,491 66.86 2,899,836 1,159,786 1,740,050 20 32 78 49
60 3,531 0 3,531 34,801 6,737 87,660 35,491 66.86 3,247,846 1,159,786 2,088,060 24 inf. inf. 59
70 950 0 950 37,382 1,858 92,538 37,403 70.45 3,736,095 1,119,355 2,616,740 28 180 458 70
80 950 0 950 37,382 1,858 92,538 37,403 70.45 4,109,915 1,119,355 2,990,560 32 inf. inf. 80
90 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 4,530,525 1,080,645 3,449,880 37 448 1,143 90
100 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 4,913,845 1,080,645 3,833,200 41 inf. inf. 101
110 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 5,297,165 1,080,645 4,216,520 45 inf. inf. 111
120 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 5,680,485 1,080,645 4,599,840 49 inf. inf. 121
130 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 6,063,805 1,080,645 4,983,160 53 inf. inf. 131
140 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 6,447,125 1,080,645 5,366,480 57 inf. inf. 141
150 0 0 0 38,332 0 94,397 38,132 71.81 6,830,445 1,080,645 5,749,800 61 inf. inf. 151
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Table 4. Response to offer price of implementing a dry-year option:  June 1 cutoff, unanticipated, Medina and Bexar counties.
.
Type of Land Use Irrigation Water Springflow Response Agricultural Income Cost of Program
Offer Irrigated Amount of Total Comal From       Cost of Water  Cost of
Springflow
Price Total Furrow Sprinkler Dryland Applied Reduction Current Yr. August Total Operation Total Average Marginal Marginal Average
($) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (AF) (AF) (AF) (CFS) ($) ($) ($) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF)
0 38,332 26,982 11,350 0 94,397 0 0 0.00 1,374,515 1,374,515 0 0 0 0 0
10 33,845 23,762 10,083 4,487 92,972 1,425 470 1.15 1,403,547 1,358,675 44,872 31 31 96 96
20 32,437 22,748 9,689 5,895 91,441 2,955 960 2.38 1,453,702 1,335,804 117,898 40 48 149 123
30 27,743 18,993 8,749 10,589 86,051 8,346 2,665 6.73 1,538,065 1,220,385 317,680 38 37 117 119
40 24,749 17,736 7,013 13,583 83,241 11,156 3,556 8.99 1,651,353 1,108,036 543,317 49 80 253 153
50 21,587 14,825 6,763 16,745 79,304 15,092 4,829 12.17 1,813,155 975,916 837,239 55 75 231 173
60 21,126 14,748 6,378 17,206 78,968 15,429 4,939 12.44 1,984,319 951,981 1,032,338 67 580 1,760 209
70 20,937 14,668 6,269 17,395 78,837 15,560 4,983 12.54 2,158,018 940,368 1,217,650 78 1,413 4,288 244
80 20,937 14,668 6,269 17,395 78,837 15,560 4,983 12.54 2,331,968 940,368 1,391,600 89 inf. inf. 279
90 19,956 13,687 6,269 18,376 76,810 17,586 5,509 14.18 2,509,058 855,261 1,653,797 94 215 828 300
100 19,886 13,617 6,269 18,446 76,677 17,720 5,545 14.28 2,693,329 848,773 1,844,556 104 1,428 5,273 333
110 19,046 12,777 6,269 19,286 75,248 19,148 5,943 15.44 2,883,393 761,933 2,121,460 111 194 696 357
120 18,055 11,786 6,269 20,277 73,211 21,186 6,474 17.08 3,082,071 648,817 2,433,253 115 153 588 376
130 17,262 10,993 6,269 21,070 71,863 22,533 6,850 18.16 3,288,346 549,246 2,739,100 122 227 815 400
140 17,262 10,993 6,269 21,070 71,863 22,533 6,850 18.16 3,499,046 549,246 2,949,800 131 inf. inf. 431
150 17,262 10,993 6,269 21,070 71,863 22,533 6,850 18.16 3,709,746 549,246 3,160,500 140 inf. inf. 461
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Table 5. Response to offer price of implementing a dry-year option:   June 1 cutoff, anticipated with 48% probability, Medina and Bexar counties
.
Type of Land Use Irrigation Water Springflow Response Agricultural Income Cost of Program
Offer Irrigated Amount of Total Comal From Cost of Water  Cost of
Springflow
Price Total Furrow Sprinkler Dryland Applied Reduction Current Yr. August Total Operation Total Average Marginal Marginal Average
($) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (AF) (AF) (AF) (CFS) ($) ($) ($) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF) ($/AF)
0 38,332 26,982 11,350 0 94,397 0 0 0.00 1,374,515 1,374,515 0 0 0 0 0
10 33,787 23,704 10,083 4,545 93,766 631 122 0.51 1,412,152 1,366,699 45,453 72 72 373 373
20 31,373 21,684 9,689 6,959 90,165 4,232 1,367 3.41 1,468,960 1,329,782 139,178 33 26 75 102
30 28,738 19,955 8,783 9,594 87,181 7,216 2,337 5.82 1,554,415 1,266,589 287,826 40 50 153 123
40 26,215 19,203 7,013 12,117 84,868 9,528 3,087 7.68 1,656,287 1,171,618 484,670 51 85 262 157
50 23,456 16,694 6,763 14,876 80,681 13,716 4,529 11.06 1,802,857 1,059,068 743,789 54 62 180 164
60 22,365 15,987 6,378 15,967 78,577 15,820 5,196 12.75 1,958,205 1,000,187 958,018 61 102 321 184
70 21,755 15,486 6,269 16,577 77,373 17,023 5,562 13.72 2,121,298 960,939 1,160,359 68 168 553 209
80 20,773 14,646 6,127 17,559 75,352 19,045 6,196 15.32 2,297,403 892,683 1,404,720 74 121 385 227
90 17,280 11,211 6,069 21,052 75,555 18,842 5,092 14.63 2,669,370 774,690 1,894,680 101 inf. inf. 372
100 16,182 10,657 5,525 22,150 74,088 20,308 5,396 15.68 2,919,469 704,425 2,215,044 109 641 6,275 410
110 15,239 9,714 5,525 23,093 71,808 22,588 6,128 17.51 3,146,362 606,132 2,540,230 112 143 445 415
120 10,255 6,376 3,879 28,077 73,383 21,014 4,038 15.34 3,804,981 435,741 3,369,240 160 inf. inf. 834
130 10,255 6,376 3,879 28,077 73,383 21,014 4,038 15.34 4,085,751 435,741 3,650,010 174 inf. inf. 904
140 10,255 6,376 3,879 28,077 73,383 21,014 4,038 15.34 4,366,521 435,741 3,930,780 187 inf. inf. 974
150 10,255 6,376 3,879 28,077 73,383 21,014 4,038 15.34 4,647,291 435,741 4,211,550 200 inf. inf. 1,043
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Table 6. Effects of offering $50 per acre not to irrigate while implementing dry-year
option in Medina and Bexar counties
Scenario
January 1 June 1 June 1
Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff
(Unanticipated) (Anticipated)
Type of Land Use:
        Furrow Irrigation (acres) 0 14,825 16,694
        Sprinkler Irrigation (acres) 3,531 6,763 6,763
    Total Irrigated Acres 3,531 21,587 23,456
    Acre Converted to Dryland 34,801 16,745 14,876
Total Acres 38,332 38,332 38,332
Irrigation Water:
    Applied 6,737 79,304 80,681
    Reduction 87,660 15,092 13,716
Amount Used w/o Payment 94,397 94,397 94,397
Springflow Response:
    Current Year (Acre feet) 35,491 4,829 4,529
    Comal - August (cfs) 66.86 12.17 11.06
Agricultural Income:
    From Operation ($) 1,159,786 975,916 1,059,068
    Payments ($) 1,740,050 837,239 743,789
Total Agricultural Income 2,899,836 1,813,155 1,802,857
Cost of Implementing Program:
    Total Cost ($) 1,740,050 837,239 743,789
Cost of Water:
    Average Cost ($/Acre feet) 20 55 54
    Marginal Cost ($/Acre feet) 32 75 62
Cost of Comal Springflow:
    Average Cost ($/Acre feet) 49 173 164
    Marginal Cost ($/Acre feet) 78 231 180
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Table 7. Potential water use reduction from implementing a dry-year option (acre feet).
County Strategy JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOTAL
Uvalde Jan 1 Cutoff 7,947 4,527 5,796 23,36519,09023,01210,313 2,605 798 821 1,255 4,987104,515
Medina Jan 1 Cutoff 6,135 4,050 6,838 21,60515,93721,097 8,377 5,046 849 539 687 3,236 94,396
Medina June 1 0 0 0 0 0 16,096 3,057 3,380 0 0 0 0 22,532
Cutoff
Unanticipated
Medina June 1 (2,781) 1,675 2,163(6,746)(5,568) 19,512 6,641 4,137 633 436 110 801 21,014
Cutoff
Anticipated
Table 8. Potential springflow effect from implementing a dry-year option - Comal Springs (CFS).
County Strategy JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Uvalde 0.22 1.87 2.15 5.10 7.0010.32 11.71 11.58 12.05 11.38 11.44 10.49
Medina Jan 1 Cutoff 11.61 15.71 19.79 42.17 53.1669.28 71.65 71.81 66.05 57.28 51.86 48.45
Medina June 1 Cutoff Unanticipated0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014.74 16.33 18.16 16.55 14.27 12.82 11.56
Medina June 1 Cutoff Anticipated (1.71) 1.23 (6.21)(10.97) 7.56 12.70 15.34 14.44 12.73 11.50 10.79
29
Table 9.Analysis of regional economic impacts from the dry-year option for the Edwards Aquifer Region, by selected scenario
Scenario Economic Impact Variables Estimated
Final Demand Industrial Output Employee Income Property Income Total Income Value Added Employment
(MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (Number of Jobs)
1. Price offers with payments 
    made from inside the region
 1.1   $10 -6.67 -8.38 -1.48 -2.97 -4.44 -4.90 -112.00
1.2   $60 -26.20 -32.54 -8.11 -9.88 -17.99 -19.62 -487.00
1.3   $90 -48.53 -59.99 -16.80 -17.07 -33.88 -36.75 -931.00
2. Price offers with payments 
    made from outside the region
2.1   $10 -6.43 -8.11 -1.29 -2.94 -4.23 -4.68 -106.00
2.2   $60 -21.41 -27.24 -4.50 -9.33 -13.83 -15.25 -370.00
2.3   $90 -36.58 -46.76 -7.79 -15.71 -23.49 -25.82 -639.00
3. Price offers without benefits
    from payments to farmers
3.1   $10 -6.79 -8.99 -1.50 -3.22 -4.72 -5.23 -119.00
3.2   $60 -25.98 -34.57 -5.97 -11.83 -17.81 -19.67 -475.00
3.3   $90 -47.54 -63.44 -11.02 -21.42 -32.44 -35.81 -876.00
4. Administrative maximum aquifer
withdrawal of 450,000 ac.ft.
-12.47 -15.74 -2.49 -5.70 -8.19 -9.04 -205.00
5. Administrative minimum -8.24 -10.42 -1.65 -3.74 -5.39 -5.94 -136.00
    springflow
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Table 10. Analysis of economic impacts from the dry-year option for Uvalde county, by selected scenario
Scenario Economic Impact Variables Estimated
Final Demand Industrial Output Employee IncomeProperty Income Total Income Value Added Employment
(MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (Number of Jobs)
1. Price offers with payments 
    made from inside the region
             
1.2   $60 -13.20 -20.01 -5.01 -5.59 -10.60 -11.56 -349.00
1.3   $90 -29.64 -44.43 -12.47 -11.81 -24.28 -26.38 -814.00
2. Price offers with payments 
    made from outside the region
             
2.2   $60 -10.99 -17.25 -3.27 -5.24 -8.51 -9.32 -271.00
2.3   $90 -22.44 -35.42 -6.77 -10.66 -17.44 -19.08 -559.00
3. Price offers without benefits
    from payments to farmers
             
3.2   $60 -12.42 -19.26 -3.58 -5.96 -9.54 -10.47 -296.00
3.3   $90 -27.18 -42.13 -7.82 -13.06 -20.88 -22.91 -647.00
4. Administrative maximum aquifer -7.03 -10.43 -1.72 -3.65 -5.37 -5.88 -147.00
    withdrawal of 450,000 ac.ft.
5. Administrative minimum -5.69 -8.52 -1.43 -2.90 -4.33 -4.74 -121.00
    springflow
Table 11. Analysis of economic impacts from the dry-year option for Medina county, by selected scenario
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Scenario Economic Impact Variables Estimated
Final Demand Industrial Output Employee Income Property Income Total Income Value Added Employment
(MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (Number of Jobs)
1. Price offers with payments 
    made from inside the region
1.1   $10 -6.17 -8.43 -1.16 -3.21 -4.36 -4.81 -108.00
1.2   $60 -14.13 -19.03 -4.51 -6.16 -10.67 -11.68 -339.00
1.3   $90 -16.32 -21.83 -6.26 -6.45 -12.71 -13.87 -443.00
2. Price offers with payments 
    made from outside the region
2.1   $10 -5.82 -7.99 -0.91 -3.14 -4.05 -4.46 -93.00
2.2   $60 -10.01 -13.79 -1.56 -5.36 -6.92 -7.61 -159.00
2.3   $90 -9.69 -13.39 -1.50 -5.16 -6.66 -7.32 -153.00
3. Price offers without benefits
    from payments to farmers
3.1   $10 -6.00 -8.23 -0.94 -3.24 -4.18 -4.61 -96.00
3.2   $60 -12.15 -16.64 -1.90 -6.57 -8.46 -9.34 -195.00
3.3   $90 -13.12 -17.98 -2.05 -7.10 -9.14 -10.09 -211.00
4. Administrative maximum aquifer -5.30 -7.25 -0.82 -2.86 -3.69 -4.07 -85.00
    withdrawal of 450,000 ac.ft.
5. Administrative minimum -2.57 3.50 -0.40 -1.40 -1.80 -1.99 -41.00
    springflow
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Table 12. Analysis of economic impacts from the dry-year option for Bexar county, by selected scenario
Scenario Economic Impact Variables Estimated
Final Demand Industrial Output Employee Income Property IncomeTotal Income Value Added Employment
(MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$) (Number of Jobs)
1. Price offers with payments 
    made from inside the region
  
  
$60  -4.72 -5.59 -1.45 -1.78 -3.23 -3.48 -78.00
2. Price offers with payments 
    made from outside the region
$60 -3.56 -4.32 -0.58 -1.65 -2.23 -2.42 -51.00
3. Price offers without benefits
    from payments to farmers
$60  -4.46 -5.51 -0.77 -2.12 -2.89 -3.16 -66.00
Table 13. Level and probability of recharge by year
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YEAR AMOUNT PROBABILITY
(ac ft)  IN PERCENT
1956 43758 2
1951 140097 2
1963 170756 9
1989 214455 14
1980 406301 21
1974 658447 21
1976 894088 21
1958 1710171 7
1987 2003643 2
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Table 14. Municipal and industrial water use for different prices and recharge years
PRICE AVG         1956        1951        1963        1989        1980        1974        1976        1958        1987
LEVEL
PRICE0        336482      354971      348255      347465      344001      345968      331572      320261      335478      334887
PRICE10       311557      329103      322731      321963      318728      320472      306980      296362      310133      309458
PRICE20       292358      309005      302990      302292      299225      300803      288041      277984      290715      289976
PRICE30       276931      292846      287140      286439      283529      284990      272829      263236      275168      274356
PRICE40       264156      279446      273988      273305      270519      271886      260233      251035      262321      261501
PRICE50       253331      268083      262841      262157      259483      260777      249562      240703      251457      250631
PRICE60       243994      258264      253187      252550      249961      251190      240356      231795      242102      241261
PRICE70       235822      249674      244767      244128      241621      242797      232300      224003      233915      233096
PRICE80       228584      242057      237266      236668      234232      235362      225166      217104      226683      225857
PRICE90       222110      235238      230589      229990      227620      228710      218785      210935      220215      219402
PRICE100      216270      229081      224549      223965      221654      222708      213029      205372      214385      213583
PRICE125      203837      215968      211688      211131      208946      209928      200777      193534      201987      201200
PRICE150      193710      205285      201202      200671      198590      199514      190796      183894      191899      191137
PRICE175      185234      196334      192423      191912      189920      190797      182445      175831      183464      182719
PRICE200      177995      188686      184921      184430      182512      183350      175311      168945      176264      175537
PRICE225      171709      182044      178409      177930      176078      176882      169118      162968      170016      169309
PRICE250      166179      176196      172677      172211      170416      171191      163669      157710      164522      163830
PRICE275      161259      170992      167571      167121      165378      166128      158822      153033      159635      158959
PRICE300      156842      166320      162992      162552      160855      161582      154470      148834      155250      154589
PRICE325      152844      162091      158844      158416      156761      157468      150532      145036      151283      150634
PRICE350      149203      158240      155067      154647      153030      153720      146944      141575      147669      147033
PRICE375      145865      154705      151602      151192      149611      150284      143656      138403      144357      143731
PRICE400      142790      151450      148412      148009      146460      147118      140626      135481      141307      140692
PRICE425      139943      148436      145457      145062      143544      144187      137822      132777      138484      137880
PRICE450      137297      145635      142711      142323      140833      141463      135216      130264      135860      135265
PRICE475      134829      143022      140149      139768      138304      138922      132784      127919      133413      132829
PRICE500      132519      140575      137750      137376      135936      136543      130508      125725      131123      130545
Note: Price is in $/ac ft.  Use is in ac ft/yr.
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Appendix A.  Input-output modeling multipliers
Table A1-1      Output Multipliers Of Bexar County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect       Induced     Total     Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 1 0.2179 0.4478 1.6657 1.2179 1.6657
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 1 0.2155 0.6143 1.8298 1.2155 1.8298
5 Cattle Feedlots 1 0.2016 0.5635 1.7651 1.2016 1.7651
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 1 0.0657 2.9668 4.0325 1.0657 4.0325
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 1 0.2117 0.517 1.7287 1.2117 1.7287
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 1 0.1981 0.2713 1.4693 1.1981 1.4693
10 Cotton 1 0.1744 0.5612 1.7356 1.1744 1.7356
11 Food Grains 1 0.292 0.5047 1.7967 1.2920 1.7967
12 Feed Grains 1 0.1758 0.4554 1.6312 1.1758 1.6312
13 Hay and Pasture 1 0.2284 0.4325 1.6610 1.2284 1.6610
16 Fruits 1 0.3014 0.4777 1.7791 1.3014 1.7791
18 Vegetables 1 0.1992 0.3933 1.5925 1.1992 1.5925
20 Miscellaneous Crops 1 0.1535 0.7211 1.8746 1.1535 1.8746
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Table A1-2      Personal Income Multipliers Of Bexar County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect      Induced    Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.027 0.0713 0.1501 0.2484 3.6433 9.2074
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.0532 0.0623 0.206 0.3215 2.1693 6.0377
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.0713 0.0584 0.189 0.3186 1.8190 4.4698
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.1406 0.0197 0.9948 1.1551 1.1404 8.2167
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.0538 0.0634 0.1734 0.2905 2.1784 5.4014
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.0245 0.0586 0.091 0.174 3.3925 7.1087
10 Cotton 0.0355 0.0493 0.1882 0.2729 2.3905 7.6973
11 Food Grains 0.034 0.0767 0.1692 0.2798 3.2570 8.2393
12 Feed Grains 0.0393 0.0478 0.1527 0.2398 2.2169 6.1022
13 Hay and Pasture 0.0291 0.0621 0.145 0.2362 3.1344 8.1196
16 Fruits 0.008 0.0872 0.1602 0.2554 11.8463 31.7630
18 Vegetables 0.0117 0.0536 0.1319 0.1972 5.574 16.8257
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.0485 0.0419 0.2418 0.3321 1.8638 6.8529
Table A1-3      Total Income Multipliers Of Bexar County
Code Sector Direct       Indirect       Induced     Total     Type I        Type III
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1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2308 0.1135 0.2494 0.5937 1.4918 2.5722
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3205 0.1049 0.3421 0.7675 1.3274 2.395
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3633 0.0983 0.3139 0.7755 1.2705 2.1343
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7571 0.0326 1.6524 2.4421 1.0431 3.2256
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.3022 0.1046 0.288 0.6948 1.3462 2.2989
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3437 0.0967 0.1511 0.5915 1.2815 1.7211
10 Cotton 0.3614 0.0812 0.3126 0.7552 1.2248 2.0898
11 Food Grains 0.4501 0.136 0.2811 0.8672 1.3023 1.9268
12 Feed Grains 0.6005 0.0825 0.2536 0.9366 1.1373 1.5597
13 Hay and Pasture 0.4795 0.1071 0.2409 0.8275 1.2233 1.7257
16 Fruits 0.1648 0.1592 0.2661 0.59 1.9659 3.5807
18 Vegetables 0.4945 0.1007 0.2191 0.8143 1.2037 1.6467
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6224 0.0747 0.4016 1.0987 1.12 1.7652
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Table A1-4      Value Added Multipliers Of Bexar County
Code Sector    Direct        Indirect        Induced     Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2356 0.126 0.2866 0.6483 1.5348 2.7513
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3414 0.1204 0.3932 0.8551 1.3526 2.5043
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3821 0.1128 0.3608 0.8557 1.2951 2.2391
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7982 0.0375 1.8992 2.7349 1.0469 3.4265
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.3247 0.1203 0.331 0.776 1.3705 2.39
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3661 0.1064 0.1737 0.6462 1.2907 1.7651
10 Cotton 0.3949 0.0923 0.3593 0.8465 1.2338 2.1436
11 Food Grains 0.4839 0.166 0.3231 0.9729 1.3430 2.0108
12 Feed Grains 0.6458 0.099 0.2915 1.0363 1.1533 1.6048
13 Hay and Pasture 0.5321 0.1286 0.2769 0.9376 1.2416 1.7620
16 Fruits 0.1769 0.1745 0.3058 0.6571 1.9866 3.7157
18 Vegetables 0.5163 0.113 0.2518 0.8811 1.2188 1.7065
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6334 0.0861 0.4616 1.1812 1.1359 1.8647
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Table A1-5      Employment Multipliers Of Bexar County
Code Sector   Direct        Indirect      Induced   Total      Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 10.0389 3.0174 7.5722 20.6285 1.3006 2.0549
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 15.0786 2.8332 10.3882 28.3 1.1879 1.8768
5 Cattle Feedlots 13.7826 2.6497 9.5302 25.9625 1.1923 1.8837
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 84.21 0.8731 50.1718 135.2549 1.0104 1.6062
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 12.3142 2.7619 8.7436 23.8197 1.2243 1.9343
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 5.747 2.4316 4.5874 12.766 1.4231 2.2213
10 Cotton 12.9537 3.4108 9.4909 25.8554 1.2633 1.996
11 Food Grains 11.0972 3.6187 8.5348 23.2507 1.3261 2.0952
12 Feed Grains 11.0741 2.2042 7.701 20.9793 1.199 1.8944
13 Hay and Pasture 9.7501 2.8625 7.3149 19.9275 1.2936 2.0438
16 Fruits 7.0268 6.9025 8.0785 22.0077 1.9823 3.132
18 Vegetables 7.2835 4.1859 6.6519 18.1214 1.5747 2.488
20 Miscellaneous Crops 18.5856 2.4402 12.1943 33.2202 1.1313 1.7874
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Table A2-1      Output Multipliers Of Kinney County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect       Induced      Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 1 0.2236 0.184 1.4076 1.2236 1.4076
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 1 0.123 0.1912 1.3143 1.123 1.3143
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 1 0.0418 0.7222 1.764 1.0418 1.764
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 1 0.1049 0.1329 1.2378 1.1049 1.2378
13 Hay and Pasture 1 0.1188 0.1665 1.2853 1.1188 1.2853
Table A2-2      Personal Income Multipliers Of Kinney County
Code Sector Direct         Indirect      Induced      Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 1 0.2236 0.184 1.4076 1.2236 1.4076
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 1 0.123 0.1912 1.3143 1.123 1.3143
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 1 0.0418 0.7222 1.764 1.0418 1.764
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 1 0.1049 0.1329 1.2378 1.1049 1.2378
13 Hay and Pasture 1 0.1188 0.1665 1.2853 1.1188 1.2853
Table A2-3      Total Income Multipliers Of Kinney County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect      Induced     Total     Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2459 0.1021 0.101 0.4489 1.4151 1.8258
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3455 0.0579 0.1049 0.5083 1.1677 1.4715
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7608 0.0196 0.3964 1.1768 1.0258 1.5468
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3815 0.0496 0.0729 0.504 1.13 1.3211
13 Hay and Pasture 0.484 0.0536 0.0914 0.6289 1.1107 1.2995
Table A2-4      Value Added Multipliers Of Kinney County
Code Sector Direct Indirect Induced Total Type I Type III
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1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2507 0.1094 0.1239 0.4839 1.4363 1.9304
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3676 0.0638 0.1287 0.5601 1.1735 1.5237
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7982 0.0216 0.4862 1.306 1.0271 1.6362
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.4039 0.0541 0.0894 0.5475 1.1339 1.3553
13 Hay and Pasture 0.5321 0.0604 0.1121 0.7046 1.1136 1.3242
Table A2-5      Employment Multipliers Of Kinney County
Code Sector Direct       Indirect       Induced   Total     Type I      Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 10.4592 5.458 3.3274 19.2447 1.5218 1.84
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 13.9395 2.6033 3.4582 20.0011 1.1868 1.4348
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 61.598 0.8815 13.0612 75.5407 1.0143 1.2263
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 9.2362 2.2581 2.4029 13.8972 1.2445 1.5046
13 Hay and Pasture 11.7033 2.701 3.0112 17.4155 1.2308 1.4881
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Table A3-1      Output Multipliers Of Medina County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect       Induced      Total     Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 1 0.2543 0.2796 1.5338 1.2543 1.5338
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 1 0.1809 0.354 1.5349 1.1809 1.5349
5 Cattle Feedlots 1 0.3121 0.3855 1.6975 1.3121 1.6975
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 1 0.0534 1.2428 2.2962 1.0534 2.2962
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 1 0.1804 0.2611 1.4415 1.1804 1.4415
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 1 0.1755 0.181 1.3565 1.1755 1.3565
10 Cotton 1 0.2642 0.3779 1.6421 1.2642 1.6421
11 Food Grains 1 0.1804 0.2697 1.4502 1.1804 1.4502
12 Feed Grains 1 0.1093 0.2792 1.3885 1.1093 1.3885
13 Hay and Pasture 1 0.139 0.2541 1.3931 1.139 1.3931
16 Fruits 1 0.3217 0.3088 1.6305 1.3217 1.6305
18 Vegetables 1 0.1995 0.2421 1.4416 1.1995 1.4416
20 Miscellaneous Crops 1 0.1208 0.5198 1.6406 1.1208 1.6406
21 Oil Bearing Crops 1 0.1538 0.2809 1.4347 1.1538 1.4347
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Table A3-2      Personal Income Multipliers Of Medina County
Code Sector    Direct         Indirect        Induced     Total       Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.0241 0.0526 0.0859 0.1627 3.1792 6.7401
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.0461 0.0382 0.1088 0.1931 1.8281 4.1897
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.0635 0.0462 0.1185 0.2281 1.7269 3.5927
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.1399 0.0116 0.382 0.5335 1.0826 3.8125
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.0473 0.039 0.0803 0.1666 1.8251 3.5216
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.0223 0.0364 0.0556 0.1143 2.6355 5.1344
10 Cotton 0.0315 0.0671 0.1162 0.2147 3.1287 6.8153
11 Food Grains 0.0305 0.0448 0.0829 0.1583 2.4684 5.1838
12 Feed Grains 0.039 0.0266 0.0858 0.1514 1.6812 3.8817
13 Hay and Pasture 0.0295 0.0335 0.0781 0.1412 2.1359 4.781
16 Fruits 0.0074 0.0808 0.0949 0.1832 11.8948 24.6882
18 Vegetables 0.0105 0.0512 0.0744 0.1362 5.8777 12.961
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.0484 0.0305 0.1598 0.2386 1.6306 4.9351
21 Oil Bearing Crops 0.0348 0.0368 0.0863 0.158 2.0577 4.5363
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Table A3-3      Total Income Multipliers Of Medina County
Code Sector    Direct       Indirect       Induced      Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2065 0.129 0.1543 0.4898 1.6247 2.3721
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.2886 0.0888 0.1954 0.5728 1.3076 1.9847
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3237 0.1289 0.2128 0.6654 1.3983 2.0556
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7536 0.0266 0.686 1.4662 1.0353 1.9455
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.2659 0.0897 0.1441 0.4997 1.3372 1.8794
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3126 0.0836 0.0999 0.4961 1.2675 1.587
10 Cotton 0.3211 0.1193 0.2086 0.649 1.3716 2.0211
11 Food Grains 0.4046 0.0847 0.1489 0.6382 1.2093 1.5773
12 Feed Grains 0.5959 0.051 0.1541 0.801 1.0855 1.3441
13 Hay and Pasture 0.4867 0.065 0.1403 0.692 1.1335 1.4217
16 Fruits 0.152 0.1545 0.1704 0.4769 2.0164 3.1377
18 Vegetables 0.4433 0.0964 0.1336 0.6733 1.2176 1.519
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.621 0.0574 0.2869 0.9654 1.0925 1.5545
21 Oil Bearing Crops 0.5141 0.0707 0.155 0.7398 1.1376 1.4391
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Table A3-4      Value Added Multipliers Of Medina County
Code Sector    Direct          Indirect        Induced     Total     Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2113 0.1409 0.1807 0.5329 1.667 2.5223
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3101 0.098 0.2288 0.6369 1.316 2.0539
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3425 0.1413 0.2491 0.7329 1.4127 2.1401
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7982 0.0293 0.8032 1.6307 1.0368 2.0431
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.2883 0.099 0.1688 0.5561 1.3435 1.9289
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.335 0.0917 0.117 0.5437 1.2737 1.6228
10 Cotton 0.3546 0.1261 0.2442 0.725 1.3556 2.0444
11 Food Grains 0.4384 0.0961 0.1743 0.7088 1.2192 1.6169
12 Feed Grains 0.6458 0.0572 0.1804 0.8834 1.0885 1.3679
13 Hay and Pasture 0.546 0.0728 0.1642 0.7831 1.1334 1.4342
16 Fruits 0.1641 0.1637 0.1996 0.5273 1.9975 3.2137
18 Vegetables 0.4651 0.1027 0.1565 0.7242 1.2208 1.5573
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6334 0.0624 0.336 1.0318 1.0985 1.6289
21 Oil Bearing Crops 0.5521 0.0796 0.1815 0.8132 1.1441 1.4729
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Table A3-5      Employment Multipliers Of Medina County
Code Sector Direct         Indirect       Induced   Total     Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 9.93 3.5432 4.6142 18.0875 1.3568 1.8215
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 14.6363 2.4251 5.8431 22.9045 1.1657 1.5649
5 Cattle Feedlots 14.242 4.3338 6.3617 24.9376 1.3043 1.751
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 58.4031 0.7183 20.5112 79.6327 1.0123 1.3635
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 10.1726 2.4124 4.31 16.895 1.2371 1.6608
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 6.6555 2.0651 2.9866 11.7072 1.3103 1.759
10 Cotton 13.0091 5.2017 6.2367 24.4475 1.3999 1.8793
11 Food Grains 10.7385 2.2601 4.4516 17.4502 1.2105 1.625
12 Feed Grains 12.13 1.3245 4.6078 18.0623 1.1092 1.4891
13 Hay and Pasture 10.5619 1.6844 4.194 16.4403 1.1595 1.5566
16 Fruits 8.0808 6.7995 5.0961 19.9764 1.8414 2.4721
18 Vegetables 7.3686 4.2992 3.9959 15.6638 1.5835 2.1257
20 Miscellaneous Crops 22.721 2.0082 8.5794 33.3085 1.0884 1.466
21 Oil Bearing Crops 11.5477 1.9867 4.6352 18.1697 1.172 1.5734
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Table A4-1      Output Multipliers Of Uvalde County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect        Induced     Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 1 0.3296 0.3731 1.7027 1.3296 1.7027
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 1 0.2086 0.4141 1.6227 1.2086 1.6227
5 Cattle Feedlots 1 0.3415 0.4501 1.7916 1.3415 1.7916
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 1 0.0634 1.6349 2.6983 1.0634 2.6983
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 1 0.2078 0.4135 1.6213 1.2078 1.6213
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 1 0.1896 0.2808 1.4704 1.1896 1.4704
10 Cotton 1 0.5692 0.65 2.2192 1.5692 2.2192
11 Food Grains 1 0.2365 0.3471 1.5835 1.2365 1.5835
12 Feed Grains 1 0.1395 0.318 1.4576 1.1395 1.4576
13 Hay and Pasture 1 0.1815 0.3177 1.4992 1.1815 1.4992
16 Fruits 1 0.5937 0.5434 2.1371 1.5937 2.1371
18 Vegetables 1 0.3779 0.3911 1.7691 1.3779 1.7691
20 Miscellaneous Crops 1 0.2086 0.5742 1.7828 1.2086 1.7828
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Table A4-2      PERSONAL INCOME MULTIPLIERS OF UVALDE COUNTY
Code Sector   Direct        Indirect       Induced      Total       Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.0256 0.0966 0.1224 0.2446 4.7773 9.5625
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.0488 0.059 0.1358 0.2437 2.2081 4.9891
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.0673 0.0687 0.1476 0.2836 2.0213 4.2163
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.1404 0.0184 0.5363 0.6951 1.1309 4.9492
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.0512 0.0602 0.1356 0.2471 2.1759 4.8235
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.0237 0.0539 0.0921 0.1697 3.2793 7.1725
10 Cotton 0.0334 0.1887 0.2132 0.4353 6.6505 13.0348
11 Food Grains 0.0323 0.0692 0.1138 0.2153 3.1416 6.6647
12 Feed Grains 0.0392 0.0414 0.1043 0.1849 2.0571 4.7202
13 Hay and Pasture 0.029 0.0538 0.1042 0.187 2.8569 6.4549
16 Fruits 0.0077 0.1994 0.1783 0.3853 27.0273 50.2937
18 Vegetables 0.0111 0.1253 0.1283 0.2647 12.2537 23.7793
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.0484 0.0661 0.1883 0.3029 2.3662 6.2566
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Table A4-3      Total Income Multipliers Of Uvalde County
Code Sector Direct        Indirect        Induced     Total        Type I       Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2188 0.1614 0.2085 0.5887 1.7379 2.6909
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3063 0.1028 0.2314 0.6405 1.3355 2.0908
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3428 0.1459 0.2515 0.7401 1.4255 2.1592
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7563 0.0316 0.9136 1.7014 1.0417 2.2497
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.2878 0.1034 0.2311 0.6223 1.3593 2.162
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3321 0.0944 0.1569 0.5835 1.2844 1.7567
10 Cotton 0.3403 0.2558 0.3632 0.9593 1.7517 2.8189
11 Food Grains 0.4281 0.1103 0.1939 0.7324 1.2576 1.7105
12 Feed Grains 0.5985 0.0658 0.1777 0.842 1.1099 1.4068
13 Hay and Pasture 0.4774 0.0856 0.1775 0.7405 1.1793 1.5512
16 Fruits 0.157 0.27 0.3037 0.7306 2.7201 4.6548
18 Vegetables 0.4696 0.1718 0.2186 0.86 1.3659 1.8313
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6218 0.0957 0.3209 1.0384 1.154 1.67
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Table A4-4      Value Added Multipliers Of Uvalde County
Code Sector   Direct         Indirect        Induced     Total     Type I       Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2236 0.1733 0.2426 0.6395 1.7751 2.8603
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3278 0.1125 0.2693 0.7096 1.3431 2.1646
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3616 0.1588 0.2927 0.8131 1.4392 2.2486
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7982 0.0346 1.0632 1.8959 1.0433 2.3754
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.3103 0.1133 0.2689 0.6924 1.365 2.2317
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3546 0.1027 0.1826 0.6399 1.2897 1.8046
10 Cotton 0.3738 0.2642 0.4227 1.0607 1.7067 2.8374
11 Food Grains 0.4619 0.124 0.2257 0.8116 1.2685 1.757
12 Feed Grains 0.6458 0.0733 0.2068 0.9259 1.1135 1.4338
13 Hay and Pasture 0.5321 0.0954 0.2066 0.8342 1.1793 1.5676
16 Fruits 0.169 0.2809 0.3534 0.8034 2.6618 4.7524
18 Vegetables 0.4914 0.1796 0.2544 0.9254 1.3654 1.883
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6334 0.1018 0.3734 1.1087 1.1608 1.7503
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Table A4-5      Employment Multipliers Of Uvalde County
Code Sector   Direct        Indirect       Induced    Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 9.9682 6.2918 6.0155 22.2754 1.6312 2.2347
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 14.6508 3.396 6.6766 24.7234 1.2318 1.6875
5 Cattle Feedlots 14.2443 5.3696 7.2563 26.8703 1.377 1.8864
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 69.1399 1.0377 26.3594 96.537 1.015 1.3963
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 14.6231 3.3972 6.6668 24.687 1.2323 1.6882
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 9.2362 2.9992 4.5266 16.762 1.3247 1.8148
10 Cotton 12.7544 15.1464 10.4798 38.3807 2.1875 3.0092
11 Food Grains 10.9679 4.1568 5.5955 20.7203 1.379 1.8892
12 Feed Grains 11.3932 2.4669 5.1276 18.9877 1.2165 1.6666
13 Hay and Pasture 10.639 3.2072 5.1225 18.9687 1.3015 1.7829
16 Fruits 8.0808 15.2462 8.7618 32.0889 2.8867 3.971
18 Vegetables 7.4319 9.6141 6.3063 23.3523 2.2936 3.1422
20 Miscellaneous Crops 19.9207 4.7262 9.2576 33.9045 1.2372 1.702
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Table A5-1      Output Multipliers Of Edwards Area
Code Sector Direct         Indirect        Induced       Total      Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 1 0.2906 0.5104 1.8009 1.2906 1.8009
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 1 0.315 0.6666 1.9816 1.315 1.9816
5 Cattle Feedlots 1 0.3087 0.6502 1.959 1.3087 1.959
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 1 0.0959 2.369 3.4649 1.0959 3.4649
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 1 0.2488 0.5399 1.7887 1.2488 1.7887
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 1 0.239 0.329 1.568 1.239 1.568
10 Cotton 1 0.3388 0.7271 2.0658 1.3388 2.0658
11 Food Grains 1 0.3432 0.5424 1.8856 1.3432 1.8856
12 Feed Grains 1 0.197 0.5079 1.7049 1.197 1.7049
13 Hay and Pasture 1 0.2519 0.4799 1.7318 1.2519 1.7318
16 Fruits 1 0.455 0.6589 2.1139 1.455 2.1139
18 Vegetables 1 0.3104 0.5082 1.8186 1.3104 1.8186
20 Miscellaneous Crops 1 0.2054 0.8771 2.0826 1.2054 2.0826
21 Oil Bearing Crops 1 0.2895 0.5477 1.8372 1.2895 1.8372
Appendix A - 19
Table A5-2      Personal Income Multipliers Of Edwards Area
Code Sector Direct       Indirect        Induced     Total      Type I      Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.0255 0.0882 0.1705 0.2841 4.4568 11.1409
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.0486 0.0761 0.2227 0.3474 2.5648 7.1439
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.0644 0.0741 0.2172 0.3557 2.1504 5.5218
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.1409 0.0248 0.7913 0.957 1.1758 6.7903
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.0519 0.071 0.1803 0.3032 2.3689 5.8461
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.0234 0.0664 0.1099 0.1997 3.8399 8.5382
10 Cotton 0.0324 0.0997 0.2429 0.375 4.0787 11.5751
11 Food Grains 0.0318 0.0898 0.1812 0.3028 3.8237 9.5189
12 Feed Grains 0.0391 0.0531 0.1696 0.2618 2.3582 6.7001
13 Hay and Pasture 0.0293 0.068 0.1603 0.2575 3.3224 8.7984
16 Fruits 0.0076 0.1341 0.2201 0.3618 18.5272 47.3031
18 Vegetables 0.0109 0.0865 0.1697 0.2672 8.9321 24.4887
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.0484 0.0557 0.293 0.397 2.1506 8.2058
21 Oil Bearing Crops 0.0348 0.0764 0.1829 0.2942 3.1943 8.4472
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Table A5-3      Total Income Multipliers Of Edwards Area
Code Sector Direct        Indirect       Induced    Total      Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.2182 0.1492 0.2836 0.651 1.6839 2.9835
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.305 0.1442 0.3704 0.8197 1.4729 2.6871
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3284 0.1411 0.3613 0.8307 1.4296 2.5297
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.759 0.0524 1.3162 2.1275 1.069 2.8031
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.2914 0.1225 0.3 0.7139 1.4202 2.4495
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3285 0.1146 0.1828 0.6259 1.349 1.9055
10 Cotton 0.3302 0.1584 0.4039 0.8925 1.4798 2.7033
11 Food Grains 0.4215 0.1593 0.3014 0.8822 1.378 2.0929
12 Feed Grains 0.597 0.0922 0.2822 0.9714 1.1544 1.627
13 Hay and Pasture 0.4824 0.1177 0.2666 0.8667 1.2439 1.7965
16 Fruits 0.1567 0.2316 0.3661 0.7543 2.4778 4.8139
18 Vegetables 0.4603 0.1537 0.2823 0.8964 1.3339 1.9472
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6215 0.1002 0.4873 1.2089 1.1612 1.9453
21 Oil Bearing Crops 0.5141 0.1314 0.3043 0.9498 1.2556 1.8475
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Table A5-4      Value Added Multipliers Of Edwards Area
Code Sector Direct       Indirect       Induced     Total      Type I         Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 0.223 0.1638 0.3258 0.7125 1.7345 3.1954
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 0.3265 0.163 0.4255 0.915 1.4991 2.8023
5 Cattle Feedlots 0.3472 0.1593 0.415 0.9215 1.4588 2.6543
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 0.7982 0.0584 1.5121 2.3687 1.0731 2.9677
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 0.3139 0.1394 0.3446 0.7979 1.4443 2.5423
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 0.3509 0.1256 0.21 0.6865 1.3579 1.9564
10 Cotton 0.3637 0.1718 0.4641 0.9995 1.4723 2.7484
11 Food Grains 0.4553 0.1915 0.3462 0.9931 1.4207 2.181
12 Feed Grains 0.6458 0.1091 0.3242 1.0791 1.169 1.671
13 Hay and Pasture 0.5381 0.1394 0.3063 0.9838 1.2591 1.8283
16 Fruits 0.1688 0.2488 0.4206 0.8381 2.4739 4.9656
18 Vegetables 0.4821 0.1679 0.3244 0.9744 1.3483 2.0211
20 Miscellaneous Crops 0.6334 0.1123 0.5599 1.3056 1.1772 2.0611
21 Oil Bearing Crops 0.5521 0.1574 0.3496 1.0591 1.2851 1.9183
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Table A5-5      Employment Multipliers Of Edwards Area
Code Sector Direct        Indirect       Induced   Total       Type I        Type III
1 Dairy Farm Products 10.0019 4.5896 8.6066 23.1981 1.4589 2.3194
3 Ranch/Range Fed Cattle 14.6225 4.4365 11.2418 30.3008 1.3034 2.0722
5 Cattle Feedlots 14.2414 4.3482 10.9649 29.5545 1.3053 2.0753
6 Sheep, Lambs and Goats 64.5843 2.2956 39.9491 106.8289 1.0355 1.6541
7 Hogs, Pigs and Swine 11.9643 3.4711 9.1044 24.5399 1.2901 2.0511
9 Miscellaneous Livestock 6.6181 3.1175 5.5484 15.284 1.4711 2.3094
10 Cotton 12.9065 7.88 12.2607 33.0472 1.6105 2.5605
11 Food Grains 10.8858 4.6217 9.1469 24.6545 1.4246 2.2648
12 Feed Grains 11.8502 2.67 8.5645 23.0846 1.2253 1.948
13 Hay and Pasture 10.3051 3.4138 8.0919 21.8108 1.3313 2.1165
16 Fruits 7.7487 11.089 11.1112 29.949 2.4311 3.865
18 Vegetables 7.3926 7.1354 8.5691 23.0971 1.9652 3.1244
20 Miscellaneous Crops 21.2912 3.7861 14.7916 39.8688 1.1778 1.8725
21 Oil Bearing Crops 11.5477 4.1112 9.2363 24.8952 1.356 2.1559
